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LYNCH v. ROGERS
be criminally responsible for injury or death to a bystander
caused by the suicidal attempt.
So, as we have seen, there are no Maryland Court of
Appeals decisions on which to support the points that have
been developed with regard to the law of suicide, but, in
all probability, Maryland will follow the rules that have
been suggested, to wit, that either an active or a passive
participant in a suicide pact resulting in death to one only,
is criminally responsible for the death; that an accomplice
to a sole suicide, who is present at the time of the act, is
also criminally liable, while an absent accomplice could
not be brought to trial because of the accessary rule; that
suicide and the attempt thereat are unlawful, and there-
fore the attempter is criminally responsible for injury or
death to a bystander, which is the result of such attempt.
FURTHER CONCERNING ILLICIT COHABITATION
OF PARTIES AS AFFECTING CONTRACTS
MADE BETWEEN THEM
Lynch v. Rogers1
Plaintiff-appellee brought an action in assumpsit against
defendant-appellant, administrator, for domestic services
rendered by the plaintiff to decedent during his life. At
the trial the defendant offered to prove that, during the
course of plaintiff's employment, she had borne an illegiti-
mate child by the deceased. The argument was advanced,
therefore, that the contract was based on immoral consid-
eration, and so should not be enforced. The Court of Ap-
peals held, in affirming the trial court, that if the bargain
was based on lawful consideration at the outset, and did
not at that time contemplate the illicit relationship, the
fact that such relationship subsequently ensued did not
prevent recovery.
For the second time in recent years the Court of Ap-
peals has been called upon to determine the effect of illicit
cohabitation between two parties as affecting contracts
made between them.2 Prior to the present case, the lead-
ing authority in Maryland was the equity case of Baxter v.
Wilburn.' There the plaintiff endeavored to secure spe-
1 Lynch v. Rogers, 177 Md. 478, 10 A. (2d) 619 (1940).
2 Baxter v. Wilburn, 172 Md. 160, 190 A. 773 (1937), noted (1938) 2 Md.
L. Rev. 291.
8 Ibid.
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cific performance of a contract which was based entirely
upon immoral consideration. The Court said:
"Contracts based upon the consideration either past
or future of illicit sexual intercourse, or stipulating for
such future intercourse, or in any manner promoting
or furnishing opportunity for unlawful cohabitation
are void and unenforceable in equity."4
This statement would seem to establish the Maryland rule
in equity, that contracts based upon either past, present, or
future illicit cohabitation cannot be enforced.5
The present case, Lynch v. Rogers, being at law, opens
the question of whether the Court of Appeals will follow
the above mentioned equity rule in a case at law. This
same question has been answered in the negative in some
of the other state courts in this country, and by some of the
text writers. These decisions and writers maintain that
while contracts made either on present, or in contempla-
tion of future illicit relations are void, yet contracts made
in consideration of past cohabitation are valid.
The great weight of American authority holds that con-
tracts based on nothing more than present cohabitation,
or an agreement to cohabit in the future are void,6 and
this seems to be true even though the contracts were
solemnized by the presence of a seal. The reason for these
decisions is obvious. Contracts which require the parties
thereto to do acts contravening public morality are repug-
nant to the law, and it follows, therefore, that the law will
do nothing to aid these parties in enforcing their oblgia-
tions.
A different philosophy is adopted, however, by a few
courts when the question is not present or future cohabi-
tation as consideration for a contract, but rather past illicit
relationship as consideration. These courts seem to hold
that such consideration is good and valid, and that the con-
'Ibid., 172 Md. 162.
For further decisions of the Court of Appeals on contracts based on
illegal consideration see Gotwalt v. Neal, 25 Md. 434 (1866) ; Lester v.
Howard Bank, 33 Md. 558 (1871) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 160 Md. 378, 153
A. 58 (1930). See also the discussion in 2 Md. L. Rev. 291, et seq.
6 Smith v. DuBose, 78 Ga. 413, 3 S. E. 309, 6 A. S. R. 260 (1887) ; Brown
v. Tuttle, 80 Me. 162, 13 A. 583 (1888) ; Massey v. Wallace, 32 S. C. 149,
10 S. E. 937 (1890) ; Harrison v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 80 Vt.
148, 66 A. 787 (1907) ; Case v. Monk, 7 Ala. App. 419, 62 So. 268 (1913) ;
McDonald v. Born, 135 Mich. 177, 97 N. W. 693 (1903) ; Randolph v. Stokes,
125 App. Div. 679, 110 N. Y. S. 20 (1908) ; Dougherty v. Seymour, 16 Col.
289, 26 P. 823 (1891); Harlow v. LaClair, 82 N. H. 506, 136 A. 128, 50
A. L. R. 973 (1927).
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tracts based on such consideration should be enforced.7 The
reason for this point of view" is well stated in the following
excerpt from an opinion of the South Carolina court, in
the case of Cusack v. White:
"The reason is, because where a woman has been
seduced, her reputation is destroyed and herself exiled
from the company and society of all the respectable
part of the community, and hence she is entitled to
some compensation or reparation for the injury from
the author of her ruin."9
It can be seen from this statement that there are two
objections to the point of view that past cohabitation is
good consideration for a present contract. The first is the
fact that past consideration alone is never enough to sup-
port a simple contract promise, and the second is that, in
the majority of our jurisdictions, an immoral consideration
will not support a contract.
An examination of the majority of the cases cited as
authority for the view that past cohabitation represents
good consideration will reveal that in almost every in-
stance there was something more by way of consideration
than the mere fact of cohabitation. 10 The question has
come up often in an action on a bond," and it has been held
that the sealed instrument imputed consideration to the
agreement which would not be rebutted by showing that
the real consideration in fact was illicit cohabitation.' 2 This
is precisely the view taken by the leading English case on
Smith v. Du Bose, supra n. 6; Burton v. Belvin, 142 N. C. 151, 55
S. E. 71 (1906) ; Burgen v. Straughan, 30 Ky. 583 (1832) ; Wyant v. Lesher,
23 Penn. 338 (1854); Denton v. Unglish, 11 S. C. L. 581, 10 Am. Dec. 638
(1820) ; Brown v. Kinsey, 81 N. C. 245 (1879).
' "Although in a few jurisdictions it would seem that contracts in con-
sideration of past illicit relations are against public policy, generally such
contracts are commended and are neither void or immoral, but instead are
legal and valid, and this is especially true where they are supported by
other considerations." 17 C. J. S. 649.
Cusack v. White, 2 Mill. (S. C.) 279, 284, 12 Am. Dec. 669, 672 (1818).
10 It should be remembered, however, that if the illicit intercourse took
the form of a seduction, no consideration would move from the woman in
agreeing not to sue her paramour for that tort, because she could not be
the proper, party plaintiff.
11 Apparently, recovery was once allowed to a woman on a bond given
to her as a "premium pudicitiae". These cases arose where a woman of
once immoral character agreed to live a virtuous life in the future. See
Clarke v. Periam, 2 Atk. 333 (1741). But similar agreements in the form
of simple contracts were not enforced. Binnington v. Wallis, 4 Barn. and
Aid. 650 (1821).
11 See Brown v. Kinsey, 81 N. C. 245 (1879). where it was decided that
the fact that a bond is executed in consideration of past cohabitation does
not affect its validity. For similar decisions see Denton v. English, 11
S. C. L. 581. 10 Am. Dec. 638 (1820) ; Massey v. Wallace, 32 S. C. 149, 10
S. E. 937 (1890).
19411
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
this subject, one that has been cited many times as author-
ity for the American view.13
A great number of our American law courts have
adopted the view that past cohabitation will not, in itself,
be good consideration to support a present contract. 4 This
view is supported by Professor Williston, in his treatise
on Contracts."8 Also in the light of the fact that ordinarily,
neither moral obligation, nor consideration that is wholly
past, will support a present contract, there would seem
clearly to be no basis for contract relief simply because the
past consideration was illicit cohabitation. 6
The one class of cases remaining for analysis are those
where the agreement, at the outset, is based on otherwise
good consideration, but subsequently the parties engage
in illicit cohabitation. This type of situation is by no
means novel to the courts, and in such instances the great
weight of authority is that the mere fact that the parties
to an agreement are maintaining illicit sexual relations
does not render the agreement invalid. 7 The reasoning
behind these decisions lies in the fact that though the
conduct of the parties may be immoral, yet this immorality
imposes no legal inhibition upon them in making contracts
which are otherwise based on good and valid considera-
tion. Although this legal problem may arise in a number
of different ways, one of the most common instances is an
action brought by a domestic servant against her employer
on the contract of hire. This was exactly the situation in
Lynch v. Rogers, and, during the course of the decision, the
Court of Appeals clearly layed down the rule that in such
instances Maryland is in accord with the majority view.' 8
1 Turner v. Vaughan, 2 Wilson 339 (1767).
"Baker v. Couch, 74 Col. 380, 221 P. 1089 (1923) ; In re Green (D. C.
N. Y.) 45 F. (2d) 428 (1930) ; Hagen v. MacVeagh, 288 Ill. App. 1, 5 N. E.
(2d) 577 (1936) ; Swartz v. Bachman, 267 Pa. 185, 110 A. 260 (1920)
Clark's Adm'r v. Callahan, 216 Ky. 674, 288 S. W. 301 (1926).
15 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) 4940, Sec. 1745.
'0 The reasoning of the South Carolina Court, in Cusack v. White, supra
n. 9, may be a good argument for establishing relief for the injured female
regardless of contract, but it does not account for the damage its result
would do to the normal contract rules, if past cohabitation alone is accepted
as consideration.
17 Emmerson v. Botkins, 26 Okla. 218, 109 P. 531, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 786,
138 Am. St. Rep. 953 (1910) ; Potter v. Gracie, 58 Ala. 303, 29 Am. Rep.
748 (1887) ; Yowell v. Bottom, 175 Ky. 635, 194 S. W. 768 (1917) ; Stewart
v. Waterman, 97 Vt. 408, 123 A. 524 (1924).
"The Court, at 177 Md. 489, quoted the following rule as advocated by
the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS:
"A employs B as a domestic servant. Subsequently A seduces B and
continues to have sexual intercourse with her. The employment is
not therefore rendered illegal and B can recover wages." 2 RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS, 1100, Sec. 589.
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An analogous situation to the one under discussion
arises in those cases where an action is brought upon a
breach of promise to marry. It has been uniformly held
that a promise to marry, based on the consideration that
the woman would submit to illicit sexual relations, is void,
and no recovery can be had for its breach. 9 If it is appar-
ent, however, that the promise was based on otherwise
good consideration, the mere fact that the parties had illicit
relations, either before or after the promise was made, will
not bar the plaintiff from relief on an action for the breach
of that promise."0
It has been suggested by some writers, however, that
when the courts are called upon to rule on a contract where
the parties thereto are living in an immoral state, the pres-
ence of such a relationship should call for the utmost scru-
tiny on the part of the courts in passing upon the validity
of the agreement.21 The reason for this position is that in
many instances the type or class of the contract in question
is such that would spring naturally from the existence of
immoral relations. It is felt, therefore, that clear and con-
vincing proof of the otherwise good consideration must be
shown to neutralize any unfavorable inferences the court
or the public might entertain from the character of the
agreement. But this suggestion does not go so far as to
break down any of the well established rules of evidence.
The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized this fact in
Lynch v. Rogers, when it refused to allow mere hearsay
evidence or general reputation to establish the fact that
the consideration, at the outset, was present or future
illicit cohabitation.
It is evident, therefore, that in so far as the question
of illicit cohabitation as consideration for a contract has
been presented to the Maryland law courts, the decisions
are clearly in accord with the weight of authority. How-
ever, the question of whether the general rule as laid down
" Edmonds v. Hughes, 115 Ky. 561, 74 S. W. 283 (1903); Hanks v.
Naglee, 54 Cal. 52, 35 A. R. 37 (1880) ; Olgium v. Apodaco, 228 S. W. 166
(1921) ; Gagush v. Hoeft, 198 Mich. 263, 164 N. W. 400 (1917); Burke v.
Shaver, 92 Va. 345, 23 S. E. 749 (1895) ; Connolly v. Bollinger, 67 W. Va.
30, 67 S. E. 71 (1910).
20 Thorn v. Tetrick, 93 W. Va. 455, 116 S. E. 762 (1923) ; Klitzke v. Davis,
172 Wise. 425, 179 N. W. 586 (1920). Also see Edwin v. Jones, 192 Mo.
App. 326, 180 S. W. 428 (1915), where the court held that even though
defendant had promised to marry plaintiff on the expressed consideration
that she would submit to sexual intercourse, yet if afterwards, while both
were unmarried, there was an understanding independent of the act of
intercourse, that they would marry each other, the plaintiff could recover
on breach of promise.
21 12 Am. Jur. 675.
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in Baxter v. Wilburn, to the effect that neither past nor
future illicit sexual intercourse will be considered valid
consideration for a contract, will be followed by our law
courts is still unanswered. It would seem, however, that
both by the weight of authority and by the weight of good
reasoning, the rule as there laid down is sound.
LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS AND
TRUSTS FOR THEIR TORTS
State, use of Kalives, v. Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital'
The equitable plaintiffs brought suit as widow and son
of decedent for his wrongful death resulting from alleged
negligence and malpractice on the part of the defendants.
The trial court held that the plaintiffs had not offered
legally sufficient evidence as to the defendant's negligence
and malpractice, and on appeal this ruling was affirmed.
It was, therefore, unnecessary for either court to concern
itself with the corporate defendant's special plea to the
effect that it was an eleemosynary institution organized
solely for charitable purposes for which all its property
was held in trust, and the replication thereto denying that
the hospital was an eleemosynary institution with respect
to the equitable plaintiffs and the decedent, a paying
patient. However, the fact that counsel conceived of the
possibility of a successful attack in Maryland upon the
apparently well-fortified exemption of eleemosynary insti-
tutions from tort claims would seem to justify a review of
the local and general law on the subject of the liability of
charitable trusts and charitable corporations for their torts.
Two Maryland cases dealing with the tort liability of
charitable corporations, have gone far toward establishing
the local law. Perry v. House of Refuge2 first directed the
attention of the Maryland courts to the possibility of the
immunity of charitable corporations from tort claims.
"Embarrassed by an antagonism in the rulings emanating
from other jurisdictions, ' 3 the Court refused an inmate of
a charitable institution recovery for assaults by the agents
of the organization. The decision relied primarily on the
1177 Md. 517, 10 A. (2d) 612 (1940).
263 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885).
8 Ibid., 63 Md. 25.
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